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The many-property problem has traditionally been taken to show that the adverbial
theory of perception is untenable. This paper first shows that several widely accepted
views concerning the nature of perception—including both representational and non-
representational views—likewise face the many-property problem. It then presents a
solution to the many-property problem for these views, but goes on to show how this
solution can be adapted to provide a novel, fully compositional solution to the many-
property problem for adverbialism. Thus, with respect to the many-property problem,
adverbialism and several widely accepted views in the philosophy of perception are
on a par, and the problem is solved.
1. Introduction
The many-property problem was originally posed as a problem for the adverbial
theory of perception, and is often taken to show that the adverbial theory is
untenable. Until now, philosophers of perception have taken the problem to
be unique to adverbialism. This paper shows that this assumption is mistaken:
the problem afflicts any view of the nature of perception—representationalist or
otherwise—on which perceptual experience involves a subject bearing a relation
to an uninstantiated property or complex of properties.1
Luckily for such views, I provide a general solution to the many-property
problem that makes use of a standard, widely-used semantic mechanism. How-
ever, this solution is one that can be easily adapted to yield a novel, fully com-
positional solution to the many-property problem for adverbialism. Further, this
Contact: Justin D’Ambrosio <justin.d’ambrosio@anu.edu.au>
1As we will see below, this category includes (i) all property representationalist views,
(ii) relational views of perception on which we can be perceptually aware of uninstantiated
properties, and (iii) views that treat the contents of perception as gappy.
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solution is superior to others in the literature in that it avoids objections to which
such proposals are subject, and provides a complete explanation of the system-
atic entailments that hold between adverbially modified states of sensing. Thus,
with respect to the many-property problem, adverbialism and a wide range of
standard views in the philosophy of perception are on a par: all of them face,
and can solve, the many-property problem.
2. The Many-Property Problem
The adverbial theory of perception was originally developed to provide an alter-
native to the act-object conception of experience: the view that in every percep-
tual experience, there is an act of awareness and an object of which we are aware.
Adverbial theories attempt to provide an alternative to this view by arguing that
the structure of perception is not fundamentally relational—for the adverbialist,
sensory awareness does not consist in a relation to an object—and they articu-
late this view of the structure of perception by paraphrasing the complements of
direct-object perceptual reports adverbially.2 ,3 The basic adverbialist proposal is
that, at least in cases of hallucination, if Mary senses something green, there is
not some object which she senses that is green. Rather, Mary senses in a certain
way: greenly.
The many-property problem is a dilemma forced on the adverbialist when
she tries to give an account of the situation described by the following ascription:
(1) Mary senses a green square and a red circle.4
2Adverbialism about perception was originally defended by Ducasse [1942] and Chisholm
[1956], and then later by Sellars [1975] and Tye [1975, 1984]. For many years, however, most
philosophers of perception treated adverbialism as untenable on its own terms, and thought that
its benefits were available to other views—typically representationalist views. Recently, however,
there has been some renewed discussion of adverbial views of perception and intentionality,
for instance, by Kriegel [2007, 2008, 2011], Mendelovici [2018, Ch. 9], Banick [forthcoming],
Bourget [forthcoming], and D’Ambrosio [2019].
3Adverbialism as a theory of perception is importantly distinct from adverbialism concern-
ing other aspects of our mental lives, including qualia, the emotions, and attention. The form
of adverbialism with which I am concerned is a view concerning the fundamental nature of
perception.
4In what follows, I will uniformly use the verb “senses” in my examples, which I take to
express a state of sensory awareness that is present in every instance of perceptual experience.
I make this choice because (a) “senses” is the verb used in traditional debates over the many-
property problem, (b) most views to which my arguments apply hold that we can sense, or
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The adverbialist might paraphrase (1) as follows:
(2) Mary senses greenly and squarely and redly and circularly.
But this paraphrase fails to distinguish Mary’s sensing from one that involves
the same properties, but pairs them differently; it fails to distinguish (1) from
(3):
(3) Mary senses a red square and a green circle.
Call this the expressive problem. In order to address this problem, the adverbialist
often tries to form complex adverbs, traditionally by paraphrasing (1) in ways
such as the following:
(4) Mary senses (green-and-square)-ly and (red-and-circular)-ly.5
However, the formation of complex adverbs in this way undermines the status of
“green” and “square” and “red” and “circular” as genuine syntactic constituents
of the sentence, and so appears to undermine the adverbialist’s ability to infer
from (3) to its obvious consequences such as (5) and (6):
(5) Mary senses a square.
(6) Mary senses something green.
Call this the inferential problem. The many-property problem is the dilemma
formed from the expressive problem and the inferential problem.6
be sensorily aware of, uninstantiated properties, and (c) it meshes well with the view, due
to Johnston, that I will use below to illustrate the broader category of views in which I am
interested. However, I just as well could have made use of “perceives”, “is aware of”, “is
perceptually aware of”, or “is sensorily aware of” to formulate my examples, so long as none of
these verbs require the existence of particulars instantiating the relevant properties.
5On this traditional approach to forming complex adverbs, which is roughly the view given
in Tye [1975], “(green-and-square)-ly” and (red-and-circular)-ly” are syntactic primitives. This
is not a particularly plausible approach to the semantics of adverbial modification, since it is
not compositional. Below, in solving the many-property problem, I will present a compositional
way of forming such adverbs, but for the moment, in presenting the problem, I will make use
of the traditional paraphrases.
6The many-property problem was originally proposed by Frank Jackson [1975]. There
have been numerous attempts to respond to it, including by Tye [1975, 1984, 1989], Sellars
[1975], and more recently by Kriegel [2007, 2008]. These attempts have met with resistance
from Woodling [2016] and Grzankowski [2018], and have even occasioned a strengthening of
the original problem due to Dinges [2015].
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3. Uninstantiated Properties in Perception
We have seen that adverbialism faces the many-property problem, but in fact,
many other theories do too—namely, those that posit that perceptual experience
involves a relation between a subject and an uninstantiated property. To see this,
it will be helpful to consider a representative view: that of Mark Johnston [2004].7
Johnston holds that the objects of hallucination are sensible profiles, where sensible
profiles are complex properties (or: complexes of properties).8 To use Johnston’s
example, in the case where I hallucinate an Italian greyhound under a desk, I am
related to a complex consisting of the property of being an Italian greyhound,
the property of being a desk, and perhaps the relation of x being under y.9 Such
sensible profiles, on Johnston’s view, serve as the objects of sensory awareness
whether or not we are hallucinating. When we are hallucinating, such properties
will be uninstantiated or partially uninstantiated. When we perceive veridically,
such profiles will be instantiated by collections of concrete particulars that have
the properties and stand in the relations the sensible profile comprises.
Now consider the following perceptual ascription:
(7) Mary senses a green square and a red circle.
On Johnston’s view, the object of Mary’s awareness is a complex property—a
sensible profile—whose components include the properties of being green, being
7I choose Johnston’s view here for definiteness and clarity, but my arguments apply to any
view of perception that involves the perceiving subject bearing a relation to an uninstantiated
property, whether or not the relation is one of awareness, and whether or not the relation
is representational. Such views are numerous. For instance, the view that in hallucinatory
perceptual experience, we are aware of uninstantiated properties is held by Bealer [1982],
Dretske [1999, 2003], Foster [2000], Forrest [2005], Johnston [2004], and Tye [2014a,b], among
others, although Johnston is not a representationalist. The view that in perception, we bear
a relation that is not an awareness relation to uninstantiated properties is defended by Pautz
[2007]. The arguments also apply to the view that the contents of hallucination are gappy,
defended by Tye [2009] and Schellenberg [2013, 2014], among others.
8Johnston moves between these two different phrases. As we will see presently, this
equivocation matters.
9It is important to note that sensible profiles can include uninstantiated relations, such as
the relation of being under. However, insofar as views such as Johnston’s allow uninstantiated
relations to figure into the complex properties that we sense, such views also face the so-called
“many-relations” problem, posed by Dinges [2015]. As we will see, the solution I provide below
solves both the many-property and many-relations problems for both property theories and
adverbialism.
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square, being red, and being a circle, and in (7), “senses” expresses a relation to
that property. In order to serve as the semantic value of the complement of the
verb, the complex property must be derived from the ordinary semantic value of
“a green square and a red circle” via a type-shift.10
So far so good. But what distinguishes a sensible profile of a green square
and a red circle from a sensible profile of a green circle and a red square? How
can we distinguish (7) from (8)?
(8) Mary senses a green circle and a red square.
In a hallucinatory case, there are no particulars available to instantiate the two
pairs of properties, and so something else must distinguish perceptual situations
in which they are paired differently. What can achieve such differentiation? John-
ston’s intention is clearly for sensible profiles to be complex properties: proper-
ties that are built up from other properties in a way that mimics patterns of
co-instantiation. Thus, the property that Mary is aware of in the hallucinatory
case must have structure: Mary must be perceive the property of being (green-
and-square) and (red-and-circular).
The standard way of forming such properties is to make use of an abstraction
operation such as lambda abstraction. Lambda abstraction allows us to construct
complex properties that mimic patterns of coinstantiation as follows:
(9) λxλy[green(x) ∧ square(x) ∧ red(y) ∧ circular(y)]
(10) λxλy[green(x) ∧ circular(x) ∧ red(y) ∧ square(y)]
In (9), the bound variables pair the properties of being green and square, and
the properties of being red and circular. The logical forms of (7) and (8) are then
given by (11) and (12), respectively:
(11) sense(Mary, λxλy[green(x) ∧ square(x) ∧ red(y) ∧ circular(y)])
10A type shift is a change in the type of semantic value that a semantic theory assigns
to a particular expression, typically to correct for a mismatch between the argument-type
accepted by a verb’s denotation and the type of semantic value assigned to its argument. The
ordinary semantic value of a complex noun phrase such as “a green square and a red circle” is a
generalized quantifier. In a standard Montagovian system, such a quantifier is intensional, and
of type 〈s, 〈〈s, 〈e, t〉〉, t〉〉. In extensional theories, generalized quantifiers are of type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉.
We will see below how to shift an object of this type to the type of a property. See Hendriks
[1993] for a systematic approach to type-shifting.
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(12) sense(Mary,λxλy[green(x) ∧ circular(x) ∧ red(y) ∧ square(y)])
Since the properties to which Mary is related in (12) and (11) are distinct, it may
appear that lambda abstraction allows Johnston’s view to distinguish between
(7) and (8), and so solve the many-property problem.
But drawing this conclusion would be a mistake. Johnston’s view still con-
fronts the inferential problem; his view does not yet have an explanation of why
(7) should entail (13) or (14):
(13) Mary senses a green square.
(14) Mary senses a square.
The reason that Johnston’s view still faces the inferential problem is that struc-
tural relations between properties—like the one between the properties denoted
by “a green square” and “a square”—are not, on their own, sufficient to guaran-
tee that relations of entailment hold between states of sensing those properties.
Just because one senses P, and P bears a structural relation to Q, such as having
Q as a component, it does not—absent further argumentation—follow that one
senses Q.11
We can see this by noting that that while “senses” validates inferences such
as the one from (13) to (14), and so “distributes” to any subproperty, many other
verbs whose complements denote properties do not. Consider the following pair:
(15) Mary lacks a comfortable pillow.
(16) Mary lacks a pillow.
The inference from (15) to (16) is not valid—Mary can lack a comfortable pil-
low without lacking a pillow, despite the fact that “comfortable” serves as a
constituent of “comfortable pillow” in the same way that “green” serves as a
constituent of “green square”. Moreover, (13) and (15) plausibly have the same
logical form; both ascriptions involve intensional transitive verbs whose comple-
11One way of bringing this out is to notice that despite the fact that (11) and (12) have
structured properties as arguments, their logical form, at least in first-order logic, is still that
of a simple binary relation; they both have the form V(Mary,P). In order to determine which
inferences such sentences underwrite, we need principles that go beyond those in first-order
logic: we need principles that tell us how structural relations between properties determine
relations between states that relate us to those properties.
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ments denote properties—i.e. both have the form given in (17):
(17) V[Mary, λx[P(x) ∧Q(x)]].
But while (13) and (15) have the same logical form, they have different entail-
ments. Thus, the structural relations between the properties to which a subject
bears relations are not sufficient to determine entailment relations between states
in which those properties figure.
To take another example, imagine that John is playing a concerto. Then con-
sider the contrast between (18) and (19):
(18) a. John promised a long cadenza.
b. John promised a cadenza.
(19) a. John omitted a long cadenza.
b. John omitted a cadenza.
Clearly, (18-a) entails (18-b), but (19-a) does not entail (19-b), even though (18-a)
has the same logical form as (19-a), and (18-b) has the same logical form as
(19-b).12 In fact, given that (18-a) and (19-b) are a minimal pair—they differ only
in the verbs that they contain—the differences in entailment must be traceable
to the differing lexical meanings of those verbs. Thus, in order to validate infer-
ences between reports of states of sensing, it is not sufficient to point out that
one property is a component of another, or that one property figures in the com-
positional derivation of a larger property-denoting expression. Rather, what is
needed is an additional, verb-specific rule that specifies how relations between
properties determine inferential relations between states of sensing those proper-
ties. What is required is to specify the monotonicity profile of the verb in question.
This is the core of the inferential problem.13
12“Omits” is not the only verb for which such inference patterns fail: they also fail for verbs
of resemblance, such as “resemble”, “imitate”, and “simulate”, and for verbs such as “lack”.
It is a substantive question which intensional verbs validate adjective-drop inferences within
their complements.
13This argument begins to show, contra Bourget [2017], that inferences within the comple-
ments of intensional ascriptions cannot be purely formal. Which inferences hold within the
complement of an intensional verb will depend on the lexical meaning of the verb in question.
I will discuss this point further below. However, I agree with Bourget that inferences involving
so-called “special quantifiers”, such as from “John wants a big dog” to “John wants something”
are formal. This may well be due to the distinctive semantic features of “something”, which are
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The result is that views in the philosophy of perception that posit relations
to uninstantiated properties are crucially underspecified in exactly the way that
adverbialism is underspecified; both can easily handle the expressive horn of
the dilemma, but have nothing to say when they encounter the inferential horn.
In order to address the inferential problem, Johnston must first make use of
the strategy employing lambda abstraction above, and second, must give a rule
specifying how the structural relations between properties determine relations of
entailment between states of sensing those properties. In short, Johnston and the
property-representationalist need a logic of sensible profiles: they need a logic
of property perception. But such a logic is exactly what the adverbialist needs as
well; they need a logic of adverbial modification.
Further, Johnston’s view is merely illustrative. Insofar as many views hold
that perceptual experience involves or consists in a relation to an uninstantiated
property—at least in the hallucinatory case—this problem is very general. Ar-
guments like the ones above can be marshalled against any theory of perception
on which subjects can bear perceptual relations to uninstantiated properties, and
these arguments hold whatever one’s views on the nature of that relation. We can
call such views property views. Perhaps the most common property view is prop-
erty representationalism. Like Johnston, property representationalists typically
hold that perceptual experience consists in awareness of a complex property, and
hold that when perceptual experience is veridical, that property will be instanti-
ated. However, unlike Johnston, they often claim, as Tye [2014a] does, that the
relation the subject bears to the property is one of “predicative representation”.
Notable defenders of such views are Dretske [1995, 1999, 2003] and Tye [2014a,b],
although there are many others as well.
Another form of the property view, defended by Pautz [2007, 2010], holds
that in hallucination, we bear a theoretically defined relation to a complex unin-
stantiated property, but this relation is not one of awareness. My arguments ap-
ply to these views also—nothing about the arguments above is specific to views
on which the relation we bear to an uninstantiated property is one of awareness.
Like many property representationalists, Pautz recognizes the need to solve the
expressive problem [see Pautz, 2007, pp. 498-499], but likewise fails to address
the inferential problem.
outlined by Sainsbury [2018, Ch. 2]. Sainsbury argues that “something” is substitutional.
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Finally, the arguments above apply to the view, defended by Susanna Schel-
lenberg [2013, 2014], that the content of a hallucinatory perceptual experience
is “gappy”. Schellenberg takes gappy contents to be modes of presentation that
are associated with certain perceptual capacities. Schellenberg’s gappy contents
are, in many ways, like properties, albeit very finely individuated ones. But in
the case where a subject hallucinates something with multiple properties—for
instance, a green square—something must fuse the gappy contents together to
account for the features of the unified experience. Once this fusion is accom-
plished, Schellenberg’s view will likewise face the inferential problem. While I
acknowledge that there are key differences between Schellenberg and standard
property theorists, I will treat “property theorist” as a label applying to her as
well.14
The feature that these views share, which makes them subject to the many-
property problem, is that in cases of hallucination, they require formation of com-
plex properties (or in Schellenberg’s case, complex gappy contents) that mimic
patterns of coinstantiation. But once they construct these properties, these views
face the inferential problem, and are silent about how to solve it.15
4. The Solution: Monotonicity
The solution to the many-property problem, for both the property theorist and
the adverbialist, is to treat the inferential problem as a problem concerning mono-
tonicity inferences. Monotonicity inferences are ubiquitous in semantics, but most
importantly for our purposes, they arise in the context of giving a semantics for
intensional transitive verbs such as “seeks”.16
14See Schellenberg [2013, p. 304] for a clear statement of the view that illustrates the need
for a solution to the many-property problem.
15In what follows, I will continue to use Johnston’s view to illustrate my points, while noting
that my arguments generalize to all property views.
16Perhaps most basically, monotonicity inferences are the result of quantification; each
quantifier has a so-called “monotonicity profile”: a distinctive collection of monotonicity
inferences that it validates. See van Benthem [1984] for discussion. Propositional attitude verbs
underwrite monotonicity inferences because on the standard semantics for such verbs, given
by Hintikka [1962], propositional attitudes involve quantification over worlds: propositional
attitude verbs are modals. Thus, it is common for semanticists to argue over the monotonicity
profiles of intensional verbs. See Forbes [2006], Zimmermann [2006], von Fintel and Heim
[Unpublished], and Rubinstein [2017] for discussion.
10 · Justin D’Ambrosio
Monotonicity inferences typically arise in the complements of intensional
verbs. In the case of intensional transitive verbs, these inferences arise in the
direct object position, as we can see by noting that (20) implies (21):
(20) John seeks a book by Quine.
(21) John seeks a book.
Even when we interpret both (20) and (21) nonspecifically, so that John does not
seek any particular book, the inference from (20) to (21) is valid. More generally,
“seeks” validates the inference patterns in (22) and (23), where F v G iff the
extension of F is a subset of the extension of G:
(22) a. S seeks an F
b. S seeks a G where F v G,
(23) a. S seeks an F and a G
b. S seeks an F,
When a verbal argument position validates inferences of these forms, the verb is
monotonic upward in that position.17
The standard semantic explanation for this monotonicity behavior is that
“seeks” has a covert modal element that quantifies over worlds in which the
search is successful.18 One way of spelling out the behavior of this modal is the
Quine-Hintikka Analysis of intensional verbs; it is this analysis that validates up-
ward monotonicity.19 We can illustrate the Quine-Hintikka analysis informally
using our example from above. On the Quine-Hintikka analysis, to seek a book
17By considering only these two inference patterns, I am simplifiying the monotonicity prob-
lem significantly. The problem for intensional transitive verbs becomes much more complicated
once disjunctive and quantified complements are introduced. However, this simplification is
justified because these two patterns are the ones relevant to the case of perception, and the
ones that form the basis of the traditional inferential problem for adverbialism. For further
discussion of the monotonicity profile of intensional verbs, see Forbes [2006] and Sainsbury
[2018].
18Other intensional transitive verbs specify conditions appropriate to the kinds of activities
they denote. For instance, desires may have satisfaction-conditions, debts may have discharge
conditions, fears may have realization conditions, etc.
19The analysis is called the “Quine-Hintikka Analysis” because it has its roots in Hintikka’s
semantics for propositional attitude verbs, which validates upward monotonicity for propo-
sitional attitudes. Quine then proposed to decompose non-propositional attitude verbs into
propositional attitude verbs in a way that would make them susceptible to Hintikka’s analysis.
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by Quine is to be the agent of a search such that, in every world in which one’s
search is successful, one finds a book by Quine. Put schematically, a subject S
seeks NP iff in every world where the search is successful, the subject S finds
NP. Monotonicity inferences are then validated by considering the systematic
relations that hold between the success-conditions of different searches.20
One well-known implementation of the Quine-Hintikka analysis is given by
Zimmermann [2006]. Zimmermann treats “seeks” as a relation between an agent
and a property, and then uses the Quine-Hintikka analysis to secure upward
monotonicity. This implementation has two steps: first, Zimmermann gives a
compositional semantics that treats intensional transitive verbs as denoting re-
lations between an agent and a property. Zimmermann then applies the Quine-
Hintikka analysis to show how the property specifies the success-conditions for
the event, and validates upward monotonicity. I discuss these two steps in turn.
In the compositional component, Zimmermann [2006, p. 736] first shows
how to take the the ordinary semantic value of a noun phrase such as “a book
by Quine”—which is of generalized quantifier type—and convert it to the type
of a property. He does this by employing a type-shifting principle that he calls
Existential Lowering:
(24) Existential Lowering: From λP[Q(P)] of type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉 to (λx[R(x)] of
type 〈e, t〉, where R is the restrictor of Q. Zimmermann [2006, p. 736,
notation modified]21
This type shift takes the ordinary semantic value of a quantificational noun-
phrase, a generalized quantifier, and returns the semantic value of its restrictor,
which is a property. Zimmermann then employs this type shift in the composi-
tional semantics for sentences such as (25):
(25) John seeks a book by Quine.
20This is analogous to inferences that arise in the complements of propositional attitude
verbs, except that in the propositional case, instead of success-worlds, we considering worlds at
which the proposition in question is true.
21For example, if Q is the quantifier denoted by “some dog”, λP∃x[dog(x) ∧ P(x)], the type
shift yields the property that serves as Q’s restrictor, λx[dog(x)].
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(26) John seeks a book by Quine
seek′(John′, λx[book′(x) ∧ by-quine′(x)])
t
John
john′
e
seeks a book by quine
λx[seek′(x, λx[book′(x) ∧ by-quine′(x)])]
e, t
seeks
λPλx[seek′(x, P)]
〈e, t〉, 〈e, t〉
a book by Quine
λx[book′(x) ∧ by-quine′(x)]
e, t
a book by Quine
λP∃x[book′(x) ∧ by-quine′(x) ∧ P(x)]
〈e, t〉, t
The principle of Existential Lowering is applied in the boxed portion of the
derivation. The principle can be seen as being triggered by a type-mismatch
between the verb and the ordinary semantic value of the quantificational noun
phrase. The principle shifts the type of the argument, and so corrects the mis-
match. The result of the derivation is that (25) says that John stands in the seek-
relation to a complex property—the property of being a book by Quine.
But this derivation is not yet sufficient to secure upward monotonicity; vali-
dating upward-monotonic inferences requires applying the Quine-Hintikka anal-
ysis. Zimmermann provides this analysis as follows:
(27) Quine + Hintikka Analysis of “seek” (with events)
For any property P, individual x, world w, and time t the following holds:
seek(P)(x)(w)(t) = 1 iff there is a search act e performed by x in w at t
such that the property of being found by x overlaps the extension of
P at (w′, t′), for any worlds w′ and times t′ such that (w, t) T (w′, t′).
Zimmermann [2006, p. 744]
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Above, the relation T is an accessibility relation that holds between world/time
pairs just in case the event that takes place at one world and time is successful
at another, and P is a possibly complex property. Thus, the analysis of “seek”
formalizes the idea that in any worlds in which the act of searching is successful,
x finds an instance of P.
The feature of the Quine + Hintikka analysis that allows it to validate upward
monotonicity is the quantification over worlds and times in the last clause of the
analysis.22 Given this quantification, we can give the following argument to show
that upward monotonicity is valid. Suppose, without loss of generality, that John
seeks a book by Quine. Any world in which this search is successful is one in
which he finds a book by Quine. But any world in which he finds a book by
Quine is one in which he finds a book. Therefore, in every world in which John’s
search is successful, he finds a book. But by the right-to-left direction of the
biconditional above, it follows that John seeks a book. So the definition validates
inferences such as the one in (22). Similar reasoning yields that (27) validates
the inference in (23), except that in this case the properties in question will be
conjunctive properties.23
5. Solving the Problem for Property Views
The tools used to address the monotonicity inferences that hold in the comple-
ments of intensional transitive verbs, illustrated with the case of “seeks” above,
can be used to solve the many-property problem for the property theorist. Since
Zimmermann treats “seeks” as a relation to a property, with minor modifica-
tions, his analysis can be converted into an analysis of the verb that expresses
the relation of sensory awareness to an uninstantiated sensible profile. To see
this consider our example from above:
(28) Mary senses a green square and a red circle.
First, we need to provide a compositional semantics on which (28) has the logical
22In fact, Hintikka’s original analysis secured upward monotonicity for all propositional
attitude verbs, which leads to the problem of logical omniscience.
23On the view proposed by Forbes [2006], validating inferences involving conjunctive NPs
in the complements of intensional verbs requires stating an additional postulate governing NPs
of this form. I omit this complication here, but refer the reader to Forbes [2006, p. 99].
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form of a relation between Mary and a complex property. A slight generalization
of Existential Lowering allows us to do just this. The original version of Exis-
tential Lowering only applied to simple properties. But a perfectly analogous
principle allows us to type-shift the denotations of complex quantificational ex-
pressions, such as “a green square and a red circle”, to the type of complex
properties.24 The generalized form of Existential Lowering takes the ordinary
semantic value of a quantified NP and returns the denotation of its restrictor, as
in (29):
(29) λP∃x∃y[green′(x) ∧ square′(x) ∧ red′(y) ∧ circle′(y) ∧ P(x) ∧ P(y)] of type
〈〈e, t〉, t〉 to λxλy[green′(x)∧ square′(x)∧ red′(y)∧ circle′(y)] of type 〈e, 〈e, t〉〉
We can then deploy this type-shift in the boxed portion of the derivation in (30),
where Q stands in for λP∃x∃y[green′(x)square′(x) ∧ red′(y) ∧ circle′(y) ∧ P(x) ∧
P(y)]:
24The only difference here is that λxλy[green′(x) ∧ square′(x) ∧ red′(y) ∧ circle′(y) is of type
〈e, 〈e, t〉〉, as opposed to type 〈e, t〉. This is just a feature of the kind of properties that hold of
two distinct objects.
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(30) Mary senses a green square and a red circle
sense′(Mary′, λx[green′(x) ∧ square′(x) ∧ red′(y) ∧ circle′(y)])
t
Mary
mary′
e
senses a green square and a red circle
λx[sense′(x, λxλy[green′(x) ∧ square′(x) ∧ red′(y) ∧ circle′(y)])]
e, t
senses
λx[sense′(x, P)]
〈e, 〈e, t〉〉, 〈e, t〉
a green square and a red circle
λxλy[green′(x) ∧ square′(x) ∧ red′(y) ∧ circle′(y)]
e, t
a green square and a red circle
Q
〈e, t〉, t
This derivation yields that (28) has the logical form of a relation between Mary
and a complex property. Thus, the result matches the logical forms in (11) and
(12) which were suggested by Johnston’s theory.
With this logical form in hand, we can secure upward monotonicity in the
same way we did above: by making use of a lexical analysis. However, the
analysis of “seeks” has two distinctive features that must be modified when we
consider “senses”.25 First, (30) makes use of an accessibility relation that holds
between worlds whenever one world makes an event in the other successful. Sec-
ond, it specifies the success of a search in terms of finding. In order for the
analogy to hold, we need to specify what the relevant accessibility relation is in
the case of sensing, and what the analogue of finding is for states in which we
sense properties.
For the case in which we sense visually, I propose the following analogies for
25Again, nothing turns on my choice of the verb “senses”. The exact same approach can be
applied to “is perceptually aware of”, or any other perceptual verb that can express relations to
uninstantiated properties.
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the property theorist: finding is to seeking as seeing is to sensing, where seeing
is a relation between a perceiving subject and a particular.26 Further, success is
to finding as accuracy is to sensing. Thus, searches are successful when you find
what you seek, and states of sensing are accurate when you see (an instance of)
what you sense.27 We can then give the following analysis of “senses”, where
sensing is a relation between a sensing subject and a (complex) property:
(31) Quine + Hintikka Analysis of “sense” (with events)
For any property P, individual x, world w, and time t the following holds:
sense(P)(x)(w)(t) = 1 iff there is an act of sensing e in w at t of which x is
the agent such that the property of being seen by x overlaps the extension
of P at (w′, t′), for any worlds w′ and times t′ such that (w, t) T (w′, t′).
In (31), the complex property P serves to specify the accuracy-conditions of an
event of sensing. The event of sensing is accurate only if the agent relationally
sees particulars that instantiate P.
We can see that this analysis validates upward monotonicity by giving the
following schematic argument. Suppose that x senses P. Any world in which a
sensing of P is accurate will be one in which x sees a particular instantiating P.
But if P v Q, this particular will also instantiate Q. Thus one sees a Q. It then
follows from the right-to-left direction of the biconditional in (31) that x senses Q.
Therefore, if x senses P, then one also senses Q. But further, the same reasoning
also validates conjunction elimination: if x senses P and Q, then x senses P.
Returning to our original example, the analysis can be applied as follows.
Consider (32):
(32) Mary senses a green square and a red circle.
(32) has the form given in (33):
(33) sense(Mary, λxλy[green(x) ∧ square(x) ∧ red(y) ∧ circular(y)])
26However, there may also be a disanalogy here: findings temporally succeed, or are perhaps
the culminations of, searches, whereas seeings do not seem to temporally succeed visual
sensings.
27Of course, the property representationalist might deny this because it treats relational
seeing as fundamental in the analysis of perception. An alternative is to adopt a conjunctive
analysis, and claim that sensings are accurate when the subject is appropriately causally related
to what she senses. Formally, modifying the analysis in this way is trivial.
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We can then apply the analysis above to (33) as follows:
(34) sense(λxλy[green(x) ∧ square(x) ∧ red(y) ∧ circular(y)])(Mary)(w)(t) = 1
iff there is an act of sensing e in w at t of which Mary is the agent such that
the property of being seen by Mary overlaps the property λxλy[green(x)
∧ square(x) ∧ red(y) ∧ circular(y)] at (w′, t′), for any worlds w′ and times
t′ such that (w, t) T (w′, t′).
Given this application, we can argue as follows. Suppose that Mary senses a
green square and a red circle. By the analysis, every world in which Mary’s
sensation is accurate is one in which she sees a green square and a red circle.
But every such world is one in which she sees a green square. Therefore, ev-
ery world in which her sensation is accurate is one in which she sees a green
square. Therefore, by the right-to-left direction of the analysis, Mary senses a
green square. Thus, from the fact that Mary senses a green square and a red cir-
cle, we can conclude that Mary senses a a green square. Similar reasoning allows
us to conclude that she senses something green. Thus, by specifying accuracy
conditions for Mary’s sensation, the analysis in (34) shows how structural rela-
tionships between properties yield logical relationships between states of sensing
those properties, thus validating upward monotonicity, and solving the inferen-
tial problem.28
This approach to monotonicity is standard in theorizing about intensional
verbs. The semantic value of the complement of an intensional verb is often
taken to be an abstract object of some kind (typically a property, generalized
quantifier, or proposition), and the truth-conditions of sentences involving such
verbs are then specified via the interaction of the verb’s modal component with
that abstract object. In some cases, such as in the case of propositional attitude
verbs, the modal element finds its way into logical form. However, in other cases,
such as the case of intensional transitive verbs, it does not.29
28I say that these states are logically related because the analysis serves as an axiom from
which the entailment relations between states of sensing can be derived. Here, “logical relations”
does not mean relations of structural entailment.
29For instance, in von Fintel and Heim [Unpublished, Ch. 2], the modal component of
propositional attitude verbs is present in logical form. By contrast, on many accounts of the
semantics of intensional transitive verbs, such as Zimmermann [2006], Forbes [2006], and
Moltmann [2008], the modal component does not find its way into logical form, but remains at
the lexical level.
18 · Justin D’Ambrosio
6. Solving the Problem for Adverbialism
The very same strategy can be employed to solve the many-property problem for
adverbialism. Solving the problem requires accomplishing two tasks. First, we
need to show how adverbial paraphrases can be given a compositional semantics,
and then we need to validate upward monotonic inferences.
Consider the adverbial paraphrase of (35), given in (36):
(35) Mary senses a green square and a red circle.
(36) Mary senses (a green square and a red circle)-ly.
Importantly, this adverbial paraphrase is distinct from the paraphrase of (37),
given in (38):
(37) Mary senses a red square and a green circle.
(38) Mary senses (a red square and a green circle)-ly.
Given these simple paraphrases, we can think of the semantic value of the object-
position noun phrase as a complex modifier, just as, on the property theorist’s
view, the complement of “senses” has a complex property as its semantic value.
The first step in solving the many-property problem is to show how the semantics
of complex modifiers can be derived compositionally. Like on the property view,
the complex adverbial modifier can be derived from the ordinary semantic value
of “a green square and a red circle”—a generalized quantifier—via a type-shift.
Recall that the ordinary semantic value a noun phrase like “a green square
and a red circle” is a generalized quantifier, which, in an extensional setting, is
of type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉. The required type shift takes something of this type and returns
a modifier, of type 〈〈e, t〉, 〈e, t〉〉. One way of implementing the shift is to let “-ly”
denote a function f that carries out the shift. We can define that function as
follows:
(39) f is a function that takes λP[Q(P)] of type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉 to λPλx[Q-P(x)] of
type 〈〈e, t〉, 〈e, t〉〉.
How does this differ from Existential Lowering? The function denoted by “-ly”
takes the same input as Existential Lowering—the denotation of a quantified
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NP—but instead of returning a property that serves as an argument to the verb,
it yields a modifier of the verb, denoted by λPλx[Q-P(x)]. This modifier takes
as an input a verb—of type 〈e, t〉, and as with modifiers generally, returns some-
thing of the same type; in this case, it returns a new, complex verb of type 〈e, t〉.
For example, if our verb is “seeks” and our quantified NP is “a unicorn”, the
type shift converts the denotation of “a unicorn” into a modifier, which, when
combined with the denotation of “seeks”, yields the denotation of the complex
verb “[a unicorn]-seeks”, where [a unicorn]-seeking is a more specific kind of
seeking. Moreover, this kind of type-shift is fully general and systematic. Just as
with Existential Lowering, the type-shift is defined schematically, and so can be
applied to any quantified NP whatsoever.30
The hyphenated output of this type-shift may at first seem strange, but it is
in fact totally familiar; such hyphenation is used in English to mark a common
form of compounding. Consider constructions such as “salmon-fish” or “duck-
hunt”. In these constructions, a nominal is adjoined to the head of the verb with
a hyphen, and comes to serve as a modifier that restricts the verb’s denotation;
salmon-fishing is a particular kind of fishing, and duck-hunting is a particular
kind of hunting.31 The modifier λPλx[Q-P(x)] functions exactly like these modi-
fiers: it restricts the denotation of the verb to a more specific kind of activity.
Moreover, this is not all that we can say about how the hyphen functions.
Just as salmon-fishing is a kind of activity that is successful only if one catches
a salmon, and duck-hunting is a kind of activity that is successful only if one
catches a duck, [a unicorn]-seeking is a kind of seeking that is successful only
if one finds a unicorn—all of these hyphenated constructions denote activities
that are directed toward standing in a certain relation to an instance of the kind
30The type-shift just presented, along with its subsequent explanation using the Quine-
Hintikka analysis, is very similar to the analysis given by Forbes [2006, p. 82]. The basic idea is
to type-shift an entire quantified NP to the type of a modifier, and then to explain the behavior
of the modifier using an “outcome postulate”, which employs the quantified NP in the ordinary
way. The fact that the behavior of the modifier is ultimately explained in terms of an ordinary
use of the quantified NP guarantees compositionality.
31This kind of modification is even more common with noun-phrases: consider, for example,
“duck-hunt”, “chicken-coop”, “three-story building”, “one-woman university” and “many-
splendoured thing.” (The latter three examples come from Forbes [2006, p. 79].) In each of
these examples, what was once an argument of a prepositional phrase comes to serve as an
attributive adjective that restricts the denotation of the noun. The verbal modifier that is the
output of (39) functions exactly analogously, except instead of taking a noun as an input, it
takes a verb. Thus, we might call the outputs of our type shift “attributive adverbs.”
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that figures into the modifier. This gloss prefigures our ultimate analysis of the
modifiers that are the output of the type-shift above. As we will see below, the
Quine-Hintikka analysis can be adapted to such modifiers, and can be treated
as a meaning postulate governing their behavior. According to the postulate (46)
below, what it is to Q-sense is to be the agent of an event with certain success-
conditions.
With this type-shift in hand, we can provide a compositional semantics for
adverbial paraphrases such as (40) by translating each of the lexical items as in
(41) and composing them as in (42).
(40) Mary senses (a green square and a red circle)-ly
(41) a. tr(sense) = λx[sense′(x)]
b. tr(a green square and a red circle) = Q =
λP∃x∃y[green′(x)square′(x) ∧ red′(y) ∧ circle′(y) ∧ P(x) ∧ P(y)]
c. tr(Mary) = mary′
d. tr(-ly) = f: λP[Q(P)]⇒ λPλx[Q-P(x)]
(42) Mary senses (a green square and a red circle)-ly
Q-sense′(mary′)
t
Mary
mary′
e
sense (a green square and a red circle)-ly
Q-sense′(x)
e, t
sense
λx[sense′(x)]
e, t
(a green square and a red circle)-ly
λPλx[Q-P(x)]
〈e, t〉, 〈e, t〉
a green square and a red circle
Q
〈e, t〉, t
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In (42), the boxed portion of the derivation illustrates the application of the
type-shifter f , whose behavior is specified in (41-d). The function f can be ap-
plied to any generalized quantifier denoted by a noun phrase in the complement
of “sense”: any such quantifier can be shifted to a modifier using (41-d), and
then combined with “sense” as in (42). The result is that to sense Q-ly is to
Q-sense—these two formulations are notational variants.32
We now need to show how this compositional adverbial semantics validates
upward monotonicity; we need to show that the adverbialist can infer from para-
phrases such as (36) to paraphrases like (44) and (45):
(44) Mary senses (something green)-ly.
(45) Mary senses (a square)-ly.
The answer is to again employ the Quine-Hintikka analysis, but to adapt it to
adverbial modifiers as follows:
32There is another way of deriving the same semantics compositionally without making
use of a type-shift. The method is to treat “sense” as semantically incorporating its direct object
argument—that is, treat it as on a par with verbs like “salmon-fish” or “duck-hunt”. On this
method, instead of type-shifting the generalized quantifier that serves as the semantic value of
the complement, we can type the incorporating verb so that it has a restrictor argument, as in
(43):
(43) Mary senses (a green square and a red circle)-ly
Q-sense′(mary′)
t
Mary
mary′
e
sense a green square and a red circle
Q-sense′(x)
e, t
sense
λQλx[Q-sense(x)]
〈〈e, t〉, t〉, 〈e, t〉
a green square and a red circle
Q
〈e, t〉, t
This semantics is very similar to the one given by Dayal [2011, §6.4] for incorporating verbs
in Hindi. We can then apply the Quine-Hintikka analysis to the result of this derivation to
explain the behavior of the restrictor, and validate upward monotonicity. I have discussed the
connection between semantic incorporation and adverbialism in other work (see Author, 2019b).
For further discussion of semantic incorporation, see [Carlson, 2006, Dayal, 2011, Borik and
Gehrke, 2015].
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(46) Quine + Hintikka Analysis of “sense”, adverbial version
For any adverb Q-ly, individual x, world w, and time t the following
holds: Q-ly(sense)(x)(w)(t) = 1 iff there is an event of sensing e in w at
t of which x is the agent such that the property of being seen by x is an
element of Q at (w′, t′), for any worlds w′ and times t′ such that (w, t) T
(w′, t′).
On this view, the adverbial modifier Q-ly serves to specify the success-conditions
for the sensory event. For an event of adverbial sensing to be successful, one must
see Q, where seeing is a relation between the agent of the event and a particular
object, and Q is a quantifier such as “three dogs”. Unlike states of sensing on the
property view, adverbially modified sensings have no direct objects, and are not
relational, but like the property view, the noun-phrases in their object positions
contribute type-shifted semantic values to the meanings of sensory ascriptions,
and these semantic values specify success-conditions for states of sensing.
We can apply the analysis in (46) to (36) as follows.
(47) (a green square and a red circle)-ly(sense)(Mary)(w)(t) = 1 iff there is
an act of sensing e in w at t of which Mary is the agent such that the
property of being seen by Mary is an element of λP[∃x∃y[green(x) ∧
square(x) ∧ red(y) ∧ circle(y) ∧ P(x) ∧ P(y)] at (w′, t′), for any worlds w′
and times t′ such that (w, t) T (w′, t′).
Given this analysis, we can argue as follows. Suppose that Mary senses (a green
square and a red circle)-ly. Given the analysis, every world in which Mary’s
sensing is successful is one in which she sees a green square and a red circle. But
every world in which Mary sees a green square and a red circle is one in which
she sees a circle. Thus, every world in which her sensing is successful is one in
which she sees a circle. But by the right-to-left direction of the biconditional in
(47), it follows that she senses (a circle)-ly. Therefore, if Mary senses (a green
square and a red circle)-ly, then she senses (a circle)-ly. Since exactly the same
reasoning validates conjunction elimination, adverbial perceptual reports such
as (36) and (38) validate upward monotonicity for adverbial modifiers.
The result is a fully compositional semantics for adverbially paraphrased per-
ceptual reports. The semantics solves the expressive problem by forming com-
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plex, quantificational modifiers, and solves the inferential problem by means of
the Quine-Hintikka analysis given in (46). This analysis serves as a meaning-
postulate governing the behavior of the modifiers deployed in the compositional
derivation, and likewise validates upward monotonic inferences. Given the fact
that adverbial modifiers are derived in a way exactly analogous to the com-
plex properties above, and governed by an exactly analogous meaning-postulate,
the adverbial view is not any more of a post-hoc regimentation of sensory re-
ports than the property view; they are simply different views on the argument-
structure of “senses”. Thus, the many-property problem is solved.
7. Montonicity Inferences: Structural or Non-Structural?
There are often taken to be two approaches to solving the many-property problem—
what I will call structural approach and the non-structural approach. The struc-
tural approach tries to provide adverbial paraphrases with syntactic or logical
structure, and then attempts to use this structure to validate the entailments at
issue in the inferential problem.33 This approach, however, has often been seen
as incapable of solving the expressive problem, because it has been thought that
building distinct, complex adverbial modifiers requires treating such modifiers
as syntactic units.
The non-structural approach, by contrast, accepts this latter conclusion: it
treats complex adverbs as syntactic units, and so gives up on validating the in-
ferences at issue using the structural features of sentences. Instead, it tries to
validate such inferences by invoking relations of necessitation between states or
propositions. Kriegel [2007, 2008, 2011], for example, takes the non-structural
approach: he accepts that complex adverbs are syntactic primitives, but claims
that some states of sensing entail others on metaphysical grounds: some states
of sensing are determinates of others, and so entail them.34
33What I here call structural and non-structural approaches go by many names. Evans [1976]
calls the structural entailment formal entailment, and contrasts it with semantic entailment. I
follow Jackson [2007] in calling the former kind of entailment structural entailment, but while
he calls the latter form lexical entailment, I call it non-structural entailment. I use the term
“non-structural” because it avoids the implication that such entailments must be semantic.
Non-structural entailments are relations of necessitation; they need not be lexical.
34There are several different kinds of non-structural entailments that can hold between two
states of the world A and B. A may a posteriori entail B, it may a priori entail B, or it may
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Given this distinction, it seems reasonable to ask: is the solution given above
a structural solution or a non-structural solution? Are monotonicity inferences
structural or non-structural inferences? Before answering this question, it is im-
portant to point out that with respect to the content of the solution just given,
little turns on the answer we provide; nothing important in the solution above
depends on whether the solution is classified as structural or non-structural. We
have seen that standard semantic resources solve the many-property problem.
The status of these perfectly general resources turns on a range of deep ques-
tions in semantics and the philosophy of language such as: What is logical form?
What is the relationship between lexical meaning and logical form? Is there a
distinction between linguistic knowledge from worldly knowledge? But nothing
about the solution above depends on answers to these questions.
However, having said this, we can still go some way toward answering the
question of whether monotonicity inferences are structural. First, whether mono-
tonicity inferences count as structural depends on the notion of structure at issue.
The monotonicity inferences above are validated by providing a lexical analysis
of an intensional verb—in this case “sense”. In the analysis, another fully exten-
sional verb that shows up: “see”. Thus, the analysis posits a lexical connection
between the meanings of “sense” and “see”. Such lexical connections are cap-
tured using meaning postulates. But often, structural entailments are taken to be
entailments that hold independently of meaning postulates linking distinct non-
logical expressions; that is, structural inferences are supposed to be independent
of lexical knowledge. Thus, on this definition of what qualifies as a structural
inference, monotonicity inferences are not structural.
However, the underlying reasoning that allows us to validate monotonicity
inferences may, and often will involve stuctural inferences. For example, to show
that “Mary senses a red square” entails that “Mary senses a square”, we need to
infer from the fact that Mary sees a red square at a world to the fact that she sees
a square at that world. This is a structural inference from ∃x(red(x) ∧ square(x)
∧ sees(Mary,x)) to ∃x(square(x) ∧ sees(Mary,x)). Thus, if structural inferences
are any inferences that involve drawing inferences using first-order logic, then at
analytically entail B. Typically, these kinds of entailment are distinguished by the status of the
strict conditional A→ B. If the conditional is a posteriori, the entailment is a posteriori. If the
conditional is a priori, then the entailment is a priori. If the conditional is analytic, then the
entailment is analytic.
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least some of the monotonicity inferences validated by “sense” count as struc-
tural. Which monotonicity inferences involve structural reasoning will depend
on the particular complements involve in the inferences. For example, the anal-
ysis above validates inferences like the one from “John senses a dog” to “John
senses a mammal”, which is not a structural inference. This inference holds in
virtue of the (necessary) subset-superset relationship between the extensions of
“dog” and “mammal”.
We can summarize our conclusions as follows. Monotonicity inferences may
count as either structural or non-structural, depending on how we draw the line
between structural and non-structural inferences. But what appears to be the
case is that, if we rely on an intuitively plausible notion of structure, monotonic-
ity inferences involve both structural and non-structural elements. They first
rely on the non-structural, lexical connection between seeing and sensing, but
also, in some cases, on the structural relations between properties. These two
components, together, solve the inferential problem.
8. Comparisons
How does this solution compare to Kriegel’s approach to the many-property
problem? To use the example we have been discussing, Kriegel’s proposal is that
sensing (a green circle and a red square)-ly is a determinate of the determinable
sensing (a red square)-ly, and so states in which a subject does the former en-
tails states in which she does the latter. The proposal just given is superior to
Kriegel’s in that it avoids criticisms to which Kriegel’s view is subject, and pro-
vides a better metaphysical explanation of the relations that hold between states
of sensing. To see this, consider the following points.
First, Kriegel’s response to the inferential problem relies essentially on the
relationship between determinables and determinates. Alex Grzankowski [2018]
has criticized Kriegel’s view on the grounds that invoking the relationship be-
tween determinables and determinates has untoward consequences: it entails
that perceiving subjects must, for every state of sensing that is determinable,
sense in every way that is a determinate of that determinable, and so be in max-
imally determinate states of sensing. In the terms used above, Grzankowski
shows that relying on determinables and determinates validates downward as
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well as upward monotonicity, and that this leads to absurd consequences.
Second, Kriegel claims that sensing (a green circle and a red square)-ly is a
determinate of sensing (a red square)-ly, and so entails it. But he also claims
that sensing (rabbit)-ly does not entail sensing (undetached rabbit parts)-ly. But
these two claims are in tension: why should an entailment hold between the
former two states but not the latter? In the absence of a systematic way of de-
termining which entailments hold between adverbially modified states, claiming
that one entailment holds while the other fails seems unprincipled. Kriegel may
claim that some states are determinables of others, but he does not provide a
justification for doing so.
Third, as we saw above, different verbs have different inferential profiles
within their complements; while “sense” validates upward monotonicity, “fears”,
“lacks”, and many other intensional verbs do not. This indicates that entailments
between different representational states systematically depend on both the na-
ture of the state in question and the relations between their adverbial modifiers.
But Kriegel’s proposal ignores how entailments between states systematically de-
pend on these two factors, instead claiming that entailments between states hold
only when one unified state is a determinate of another. Thus, Kriegel’s proposal
misses a crucial explanatory generalization.
The form of adverbialism developed here avoids all of these problems. First,
since the proposal just developed does not rely on the relationship between de-
terminables and determinates, and instead employs the Quine-Hintikka analysis,
it avoids Grzankowski’s criticisms—it validates only upward monotonicity. Sec-
ond, since the Quine-Hintikka analysis is intensional, it accounts for the inten-
sionality within the complement of “sense”, and provides a principled way of
distinguishing between adverbially modified states up to necessary equivalence
of their modifiers.35 Third, this proposal provides a systematic account of the
35In distinguishing between states of sensing only up to necessary equivalence of adverbial
modifiers, this form of adverbialism is not hyperintensional. Accordingly, if a subject senses
P-ly, and necessarily, all and only Ps are Qs, then the subject senses Q-ly. Further, it follows
from the Quine-Hintikka analysis that if a subject senses anything, the subject senses the
property of being self-identical (or any other property that everything has necessarily). These
consequences are features of a possible-worlds approach to spelling out success-conditions,
and are exactly analogous to the problems occasioned by the Hintikka analysis of propositional
attitudes. However, there are well-known ways of addressing these problems. For one approach
to hyperintensionality, see Forbes [2006, Ch. 8]. For an attempt to solve the analogue of the
logical omniscience problem, see Zimmermann [2006].
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entailment relations between states of sensing that reveals how they depend on
both the nature of the state in question and the relations between modifiers of
that state. Given a verb V and two adverbs Q-ly and R-ly, it determines whether
x Vs Q-ly entails that x Vs R-ly in terms of whether fulfillment of the success-
conditions specified by Q-ly likewise specify the success-conditions specified by
R-ly.
The present proposal also has the advantage of being fully compositional.
Kriegel himself does not discuss the question of compositionality, but his solu-
tion appears to be non-compositional: determinate to determinable inferences
rely on our knowledge of the relations between the modifiers denoted by syn-
tactically simple expressions. But given that such modifiers can be arbitrarily
complex, it appears that even if certain adverbially modified states of sensing ne-
cessitate each other, we could not come to know that they do.36 By contrast, while
the view developed here does require some knowledge of relations between lexi-
cal items—between the meanings of “sense” and “see”—it is fully compositional,
and can thus underwrite our knowledge of entailments between states of sensing
that are modified in arbitrarily complex ways.
Finally, the solution presented here is based on a mechanism that is totally
standard in semantics, and is necessary for purposes other than solving adver-
bialism’s inferential problem. Adopting it subsumes the inferential problem for
adverbialism—which has at times appeared intractable—under a much broader
semantic problem that is not intractable. On the contrary, it is a problem for
which there is a widely accepted solution. As such, there appears to be no rea-
son why those inclined towards Kriegel’s adverbialism—or toward other forms
of adverbialism—should resist adopting it.
9. Conclusion
The foregoing arguments show that with respect to the many-property problem,
a range of property views in the philosophy of perception are on a par with ad-
verbialism. Both property views and adverbial views treat the complements of
perceptual verbs in nonstandard ways. Property theorists treat them as denoting
36This point has been noted already by Alexander Dinges [2015, p. 233, n. 2]; here I simply
reiterate it. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies for rightly pointing
this out.
28 · Justin D’Ambrosio
complex properties, while the adverbialist treats them as denoting complex ad-
verbial modifiers. Further, both of these nonstandard treatments are derived
from the ordinary meaning of the direct-object noun phrase via a type-shift.
Both views can then make use of the Quine-Hintikka analysis—which shows
how the structural relationships between properties determine relationships of
entailment between states of sensing—to validate upward monotonic inferences.
The resulting form of adverbialism differs from traditional adverbial views in
that it involves success-conditions, and these success-conditions are essential to
the adverbialist’s ability to overcome the many-property problem. Insofar as this
form of adverbialism involves success-conditions, and specifies these success-
conditions in terms of relational seeings, it takes relational seeing as explanato-
rily fundamental. However, the view is one on which the success-conditions of
adverbial perceptual states are specified by adverbial modifiers, and on which
in the case of a hallucination, there simply is no object to which the hallucinat-
ing subject is related. This captures the main desiderata on an adverbial view of
perception.
The result is that views in the philosophy of perception that invoke relations
to uninstantiated properties are not as different from adverbialism as many have
thought. The main difference between them is that property views typically
maintain that the direct object of hallucinatory experiences is a property, while
the adverbialist maintains that hallucinations have no direct objects. Thus, their
analysis of the structure of perceptual states differ. However, while the adverbial-
ist and the representationalist differ concerning the structure of perceptual states,
both take states to involve the specifications of conditions—accuracy conditions
for the representationalist, and success-conditions for the adverbialist. Insofar
as both adverbialism and representationalism involve the specification of such
conditions for perceptual states, and spell them out using the Quine-Hintikka
analysis, they have much much more in common than is typically thought.
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